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Based on an agent based model of opinion changes, described in detail in a recent paper ([1],
arXiv:1507.00126), we attempt to predict, three months in advance, the range of possible results
of the Polish parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 25, 2015. The model reproduces semi-
quantitatively the poll results for the three parties which dominated the recent presidential elections
and allows estimation of some variations of the electoral propaganda campaigns by the parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recently published agent based model of the break-
down of a stable two party political stalemate [1] allows
to consider various scenarios dependent on the propa-
ganda strategies of the political forces. The model itself,
considering the interplay of emotions and information in
shaping of the individual opinions has been presented in
detail in a series of papers [2–4].
In this short communication we attempt to refine
the model parameters (in particular the ones describing
the party communication strategies), to achieve a semi-
quantitative agreement with the data describing the sup-
port of political parties in Poland, between January and
August 2015, as well as to predict the range of outcomes
for the forthcoming Polish parliamentary elections.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides
a short introduction to the political situation, to provide
the context for the model; Section III describes the simu-
lation procedure, especially the description of the model
for the party propaganda, which provides the basis for
the parameter choices. Section IV contains the results of
the model and the discussion of the dependence on the
parameters. We refer the Reader to the references men-
tioned above for the details of the model, in particular the
aspects of agent-agent interactions and the interplay of
emotions and information leading to the opinion changes
in individual agents.
II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The political landscape of Poland for the past ten years
has been dominated by two parties Platforma Obywatel-
ska (PO, Civic Platform) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´
(PiS, Law and Justice). Since 2005 until 2014, the two
parties have enjoyed a virtual dominance on the Polish
political scene, as documented not only by the results of
the parliamentary elections but also the presidential ones,
elections to the European Parliament and local elections.
It is also confirmed by the data from popularity polls,
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which show practically stable, comparable in size high
level support (25% to 45%) for the two parties. [5] Dur-
ing the past five years, the leadership changes a few times,
but as can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, the differences
between the support for each party, as measured by in-
dividual polls, is comparable to the difference between
the two parties. There are several other political parties
active on the political scene, but until 2015 their support
was much smaller than for the PO and PiS (typically the
largest of the minor parties captured, at best, less than
half of the support of the two dominant ones). Between
2005 and 2007 the government was formed by a PiS led
coalition, but the party was forced to call an early elec-
tions in 2007, which it lost to PO. Since then, a coalition
of PO and PSL (peasants’ party) has been in power, win-
ning again in 2011, while PiS has remained the strongest
opposition party.
A significant change occurred during the first half of
2015, driven by the presidential election campaign (the
two tours of the elections were held on May 10 and May
24). Initially, the contest was between the incumbent
president, Mr Bronislaw Komorowski (supported by PO)
and the candidate of PiS, Mr Andrzej Duda. The initial
polls indicated roughly 60% support for Mr Komorowski,
allowing him to win in the first voting round. The situa-
tion changed when an independent candidate, Mr Pawel
Kukiz, running a grassroots campaign without significant
funding or organized support, managed to gather, in the
space of a few months, more than 20% of votes in the first
round of the election. This support, driven largely by the
dissatisfaction with the current political state, occurred
mostly at the expense of the PO candidate. The equilib-
rium between PO and PiS was broken, and the second
round of voting led to the election of Mr Duda. More-
over, the increase of the PiS popular support extended
beyond the presidential elections, as can be seen from
Figure 2. At the same time, the support for Mr Kukiz
began to drop very fast a few weeks after the elections,
despite his declarations of forming a permanent political
movement.
A plausible explanation of the apparent ease with
which Mr Kukiz gained popularity is based on the asym-
metry of the prior communication strategies of the two
main parties. Relying on strongly polarized media, which
allowed to specify the target of the propaganda mes-
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2FIG. 1. Evolution of the support for major political parties in Poland 2010–2014. PO and PiS are the main contenders, while
SLD (socialdemocrats) and PSL (peasants party) are examples of smaller parties, existing on the scene during the whole 25
year post-communist era, with small but well entrenched core electoral base. The data on PiS groups them together with two
other parties, PJN and SP, which have split-off from PiS during the period, but which have since returned to form a single
political entity in late 2014. As the three parties address the same electorate with very similar propositions, we treat them
together in the polls analysis. Since 2007, PSL is the coalition partner of PO. TR (Ruch Palikota/Twoj Ruch) is a party formed
in mid-2011 by a PO dissident, which has enjoyed a brief period of success between 2011 and 2012. Data from Mr Maciej
Witkowiak, http://niepewnesondaze.blogspot.com/.
sages (with most of the communication addressed to the
current supporters), the parties maintained the status
quo. The crucial difference between the approaches of
the two parties was that in the case of PO, most of the
messages focused on positive imagery, without invoking
strong emotions and allowing room for a rational debate
and doubts, the communication strategy of PiS relied on
buildup of strong, negative emotions establishing, within
their electorate, the party view as an unquestionable one.
In this situation, the appearance of Mr Kukiz as an
alternative was accepted much more easily by the PO
electorate. The lack of the emotional commitment al-
lowed to exploit any local dissatisfaction – in fact many
of the voters who supported Mr Kukiz admitted that
they voted for him to show PO that they are dissatisfied
with some aspects of the 8 years of PO led government.
On the other hand, the emotional mobilization of the PiS
electorate has allowed them to consolidate their wins and
gain momentum ahead of the parliamentary elections in
October.
III. MODELING PARTY PROPAGANDA
The detailed explanation of the model describing how
the “invasion” by Mr Kukiz changed the political land-
scape was presented in [1]. In the current work we at-
tempt to extend the model to describe the two months
after the presidential elections (June–July) and provide
a prediction for the possible outcome of the October par-
liamentary elections.
The key elements of the model is the description of the
factors driving the individual opinion changes. These
may be divided into two parts. The first is related
to direct interactions between people, described using
the Emotion/Information/Opinion (E/I/O) agent based
model, introduced in [2–4]. Using an agent based model
in a simple 2D geometry it is possible to derive the stable
two party outcome, corresponding to the PO/PiS split in
the society. In the absence of external propaganda, such
split may be a very stable one.
The situation may change due to media communica-
tions and the propaganda of the parties. These differ
from the agent-to-agent contacts in the range of opera-
tion. While the interpersonal contacts are assumed to be
3FIG. 2. Evolution of the support for major political parties in Poland in 2015. The data for Mr Kukiz party (which started to
get recognized in the polls since June 2015) is spliced with his personal support in the presidential elections. Due to the nature
of the movement, based largely on the personality of the leader, we think such data use is permissible. Solid lines are lowess
smoothed data, while the dashed line for the Kukiz support represents the best fit of a formula combining logistic growth and
exponential decay [1]. Data from Mr Maciej Witkowiak, http://niepewnesondaze.blogspot.com/.
short range (among direct contacts), media may reach
large groups simultaneously and act within and outside
the enclaves of local consensus. They also reflect, in an
organized way, the communication strategies of the par-
ties.
The proper treatment of the propaganda messaging
within the model requires the combination of conceptual
simplicity (to allow at least qualitative understanding of
the parameters used) with enough complexity, to reflect
the possibility of differing communication strategies.
As described in the previous paper, we define four cat-
egories of the party propaganda messages. The first divi-
sion is between the “internal” messages (addressed to the
party supporters) and “external” ones (addressed outside
the current support base. Such a split is quite common
in real societies. For example, it is well documented in
the case of the conservative/liberal media and their re-
cipients in the United States [6–10]. We note that the
level of polarization of the media in Poland is, proba-
bly, even deeper than in the US: there are newspapers,
journals, TV stations and WEB pages “serving” only one
group of loyal subscribers. Despite much smaller volume
of the research devoted to the Polish political behavior,
the effects of bias, motivated reasoning and echo cham-
bers were confirmed in an analysis related to the 2010
presidential elections [11]. The positive feedback between
the perception and confirmation biases of the individual
consumers of information and the economic and political
interests of the media companies drives this process re-
lentlessly. In fact, most of the political communication
is addressed internally, not externally. It is only in cases
such as the rise of Mr Kukiz campaign, that the media ef-
fectively break the barriers and communicate outside the
usual envelope, because the rise of his popularity became
“news” in itself.
The media messages may be further divided accord-
ing to their intent and content. The internal propaganda
may take two forms: “mobilizing” (aimed at increasing
4the emotional commitment of the supporters, transition-
ing them from the calm into the agitated state, in which
they are immune to any contrary argumentation, ratio-
nal or not); and “demobilizing”, which act in the opposite
way: they make the agitated agents calm, and on top of
that, they make the calm agents bored, turning them
into the neutral state. As one can guess, this division is
intended to mimic the main propaganda strategies of PiS
and PO.
The external propaganda comes again in two types:
“rational” – aimed at converting neutral agents into the
party supporters, and, additionally, converting calm sup-
porters of other parties into neutral agents via rational
argumentation. The latter effect may, in some cases,
backfire, as with some probability the agent receiving the
message containing contrary views may become angered
by it and turn from its calm state to an agitated one (just
like the effects of an encounter between two calm agents
supporting different parties in the E/I/O model). The
second group are “external-irrational” messages. Mostly,
they are a spillover from the internal mobilizing propa-
ganda, and their effect is twofold: they may change neu-
tral agents directly to the agitated supporters, but they
turn calm opponents into agitated ones – as a simple re-
action to the emotionally loaded content intended against
them.
A we have noted, the longstanding dominance and
the relative stability of the PO/PiS almost symmetric
duopoly is interesting because the two parties relied on
asymmetric communication strategies. PO has focused
on the achievements of the PO government and of Poland
as a country: the international position, the economic
growth, new infrastructure built with EU funds etc. Most
of these achievements were true – but had little in com-
mon with the individual perceptions of the voters, and
did not evoke substantial emotional response. As a re-
sult, even minor inconveniences caused by the govern-
ment policies were sufficient to diminish the commitment
of the supporters. Moreover, any misbehavior of the PO
politicians opened way to successful attacks.
In contrast, the PiS campaign throughout the period
2005–2007 was almost wholly based on emotional appeal,
largely focused on negative feelings. After the lost elec-
tions in 2007, and especially after the tragic plane crash
which caused the death of the PiS backed president Mr
Lech Kaczynski in 2010, almost all communications were
directed internally and focused on mobilization of its elec-
torate.
Due to the separation of the communication channels
the situation was remarkably stable, with the exception
of 2011, when a splinter party (Twoj Ruch, TR) formed
by an ex-PO member of parliament, managed to cap-
ture almost 10% of the votes, at the expense of PO (see
Figure 1). PO and TR shared most of the ideological
baseline, but the TR supporters were mostly people who
voted previously for PO but were dissatisfied with the
day-to-day policies of the party and the government.
The breakdown of the stability observed in 2011,
FIG. 3. An example of raw (not normalized) results of three
party simulation. Orange: PO, blue: PiS, brown: Kukiz,
gray: undecided (neutral) agents. Time is measured in MC
steps – messages per agent. The size of the model is 160 000
agents organized in a square, as described in ref [1].
caused by te asymmetry in the emotional state of the
supporters of the two dominant parties and a success-
ful “invasion” by a newcomer, capturing a foothold in
the support base of only one of the parties, has been re-
peated in 2015, at a much larger scale. The support for
Mr Kukiz and his political movement has very quickly
reached over 20%, with a corresponding drop in the de-
clared support for PO (Figure 2). The general shape of
the support for Mr Kukiz (as known so far) closely re-
sembles that for the TR growth and decay of popularity,
which suggests similarity of the driving mechanisms.
IV. MODEL RESULTS
A. Modifications of the model: from qualitative to
semi-quantitative results
The model presented in reference [1] provided a qual-
itative agreement with the observed support evolution.
As newer poll results appeared in the press, we became
tempted to try to transition from the qualitative into a
semi-quantitative regime.
The first step in this attempt is to map the results of
the three party model onto the real world. Within the
model, the support for the three parties and the neu-
tral agents always adds up to 100%. An example of the
raw, unadjusted simulation run results is presented in
Figure 3. On the other hand, the reported poll results
5FIG. 4. The ratio of the summed support for PiS (together
with SP and PJN), PO and Kukiz, in relation to the total
reported support for all parties considered within each poll.
This allows to normalize the results of the three party agent
based model to the real world. Black dots: results for the
individual polls, red line: best fit with a quadratic function,
used in normalizing the raw simulation results.
contain also data for the other parties (which in the Pol-
ish case provide a small but non-negligible contribution),
as well as the undecided voters (for some of the polls).
Using the raw data would naturally lead to a sizable over-
estimate of the popularity of the three parties.
Fortunately, for the period of 2010–2015, the observed
ratio of the summed popularity of the three parties (as-
suming zero popularity for Mr Kukiz before 2015), has
followed a rather stable pattern, which could be approxi-
mated by a parabola, as shown in Figure 4. This allowed
us to normalize the simulation results to the reported
poll results, by multiplying the raw numbers (summing
to 100%) by the value of the smoothed three-party sup-
port in the actual polls. This normalization, which is
independent of the simulation parameters allowed to re-
produce the observed support quite well, as shown in
Figure 5.
B. Comparison of simulation results with
observations and model predictions
The goals of the current work are twofold. The first
is to determine model parameters (especially the param-
eters describing the party propaganda strategies) which
lead to a good agreement with the real world data (up
to mid-June 2015), and, at the same time, remain in a
reasonable agreement with the estimations of the actual
propaganda intensities.
The second goal was to study the effects of possible
future strategies, chosen by the parties on the expected
results of the parliamentary elections scheduled for late
October.
The parameters used in the model are designed to cor-
respond to some features of reality, so that, in princi-
ple they could be compared with certain characteristics
of the social system (such as the relative frequencies of
media messages of the four types) or of the individual
perception and response. Unfortunately, in this quick
communication, there is no such comparison, backed by
objective data. The ranges of the parameters are instead
based in the author’s estimates of the actual social activ-
ity in Poland.
The first of these is that external sources (media, pro-
paganda) play a more important role in shaping the opin-
ions and emotions related to the political issues in Poland
than personal contacts. in the workplace and family rela-
tionships, in many cases, people avoid the sensitive topic,
in order to minimize the conflicts. On the other hand,
the media thrive on the polarized messages. For these
reasons we have assumed in the simulations that for each
agent, on average, 80% of the political messages come
from party propaganda sources, while 20% are result of
interactions with social neighbors. The 20% of the mes-
sages between the agents are generated directly from the
internal states of the agents: their emotions and opinions.
The remaining 80% of messages, attributed to propa-
ganda, are divided between the three parties, and within
these divisions, into the four categories: internal mobiliz-
ing, internal demobilizing, external rational and external
irrational. At each simulation step, a message is gener-
ated randomly, following the probabilities which are the
main simulation parameters for the model. These proba-
bilities may, of course, vary in time as the parties’ media
strategies change.
To simplify the situation we have split the simulated
timespan into four periods. The first, up to 200 messages
per agent in MC units, is a starting phase, during which
the domains of agents holding similar views form (see [1]).
From our point of view this period may be considered
as devoted to create the realistic, nonrandom starting
conditions.
The next period (denoted as A in Table I), between
200 MC steps and 800 MC steps, is the period during
which the effects of the asymmetric propaganda of PO
and PiS take effect. As can be seen from Figure 3, for
the chosen parameters, after a very short adjustment pe-
riod just after T=200, the configuration remains frozen,
with the ratio of PO/PiS supporters determined by the
distribution of the initial seeds. As shown in Table I,
during this period PO strategy is composed mostly (25%
points from the total of 80% available to both parties) on
rational, external propaganda, focused on promoting the
country’s successes. We assumed that 10% of PO mes-
sages had internal demobilizing effects, as the main sto-
rylines did not relate to personal experiences of the party
supporters. In contrast, most (40%) of the messages of
PiS were internal mobilizing, as the party focused on its
hardcore electorate, stirring and keeping high emotional
6Time period A Time period B Time period C
MC steps 200–800 800–950 950–1180
Corresponding real time before March 14 March 14 – June 10 June 10 – October 30
Message type Message ratio
PO mobilizing 0.00 0.00 0.173± 0.014
PO demobilizing 0.10 0.05 0.017± 0.024
PO rational 0.25 0.15 0.108± 0.030
PO irrational 0.00 0.00 0.00
PO total 0.35 0.20 0.30
PiS mobilizing 0.40 0.30 0.294± 0.024
PiS demobilizing 0.00 0.00 0.00
PiS rational 0.00 0.01 0.064± 0.036
PiS irrational 0.05 0.09 0.042± 0.018
PiS total 0.45 0.40 0.40
Kukiz mobilizing 0.00 0.10 0.032± 0.010
Kukiz demobilizing 0.00 0.00 0.018± 0.010
Kukiz rational 0.00 0.06 0.012± 0.010
Kukiz irrational 0.00 0.04 0.038± 0.010
Kukiz total 0.00 0.20 0.10
TABLE I. Parameters used in the simulations presented in Figure 5. for time period C we provide an average value and 2σ
range of the parameter sets used to study possible variants of parties’ communication strategies between July and October
2015.
FIG. 5. Comparison of the model results with the observed popularity. The model results are extended to October 25th,
located at the right edge of the figure panels. Left panel: thin lines: results of simulations for individual communication
strategy parameters, thick lines: averaged values. Results of the three party agent based model are rescaled to correspond to
the actual support in a multi-party environment. Two time points are set as the event timelines: T1 = 800 MC steps per agent
(rescaled to March 14, 2015) as the appearance of Mr Kukiz propaganda and T2 = 950 MC steps (rescaled to late June 10,
2015, second round of the presidential elections), as the time when the three parties change their communication strategies.
The right panel shows, for clarity, a comparison between the smoothed values of the poll results and the average of the 50 runs
of the model.
7commitment. The remaining 5% was assumed to be of
the external irrational type, due mostly to the spillover
of internal propaganda to outsiders, who perceived it as
hate and aggression. We assumed slightly greater value
of overall PiS activity, compared with PO, corresponding
qualitatively to the actual activity.
The third period (denoted as B in Table I), starting
at T=800 MC steps per agent, which coincides with the
moment when Mr Kukiz is noticed as one of the presi-
dential candidates and starts to receive media attention.
The abstract T=800 MC was thus set to correspond to
March 14, 2015. The appearance of Mr Kukiz as “news”
naturally decreased the attention given to the two other
parties. Moreover, to reflect a relatively lackluster cam-
paign of the PO presidential candidate, the activity of
PO was assumed to drop much more than that of PiS.
PO messages remained split between internal demobiliz-
ing and external rational, while PiS largely preserved the
focus on internal mobilizing and external irrational. As
the campaign entered later stages, at least some of the
PiS propaganda became addressed outside the core sup-
port base in a rational way, reflected by a small value
of the corresponding parameter. media communications
related to Mr Kukiz (assumed to reach 20% of the media
stream) was split between mobilization of the newly won
supporters (10%), some (6%) rational messages, designed
to win new supporters and a smaller fraction (4%) of
messages perceived as irrational. This phase of the simu-
lations is assumed to end at T=950 MC steps, which we
set to correspond to June 10, at which time the results
of the presidential elections won by the PiS candidate
were absorbed by the population and Mr Kukiz begun in
earnest to form his political movement.
We have run multiple simulations and combinations of
the parameters for the periods A and B, but in this work
we present only the results for a single set which repro-
duces well the observed changes in the parties popularity
till June 2015. In contrast, the fourth period (denoted as
C), starting with T=950 MC steps, equivalent to June 10,
is treated as the basis for prediction of possible outcome
of the parliamentary elections and covers various scenar-
ios of different mixes of each party message types. The
general choice of the parameters for this period is based
on the observed significant changes in the actual media
strategies of the parties, visible so far. Let us start with
Mr Kukiz: after the initially high media coverage during
the presidential campaign and shortly after, the stream
of news has dropped sharply. Moreover, Mr Kukiz begun,
almost immediately, to quarrel with some of his backers.
To reflect this we have decreased his part of the media
messages to 10%, out of which roughly half were internal
and half external. A part of the internal messages con-
tinued too mobilize, but a significant fraction should be
considered demobilizing. Also the fraction of messages
externally perceived as irrational has increased sharply,
with respect to the total ratio of messages related to Mr
Kukiz and his movement.
In contrast, the PiS strategy has changed only slightly
– but with significant results. As before, most of the
messages are still addressed to the current electoral base
with mobilizing effects. But the composition of the ex-
ternal messages (addressed to the supporters of PO and
Mr Kukiz and to the undecided) are now rational and
calm, capable of winning new supporters. The politicians
chosen as campaign leaders are perceived as conciliatory,
calm, rational and positive. The controversial, loaded
topics, so prominently visible in the past, are downplayed
or absent. This is reflected, in our simulations, by a much
larger probability of external rational messages.
The largest change may be observed in the PO strat-
egy: woken up by the loss of the presidency, the party
increased its activity, and while still large effort is di-
rected externally with rational appeals, internally there is
a strong shift towards mobilizing messages (based mostly
on the negative emotions connected with ‘what would
happen should PiS win’).
For the fourth simulation period we have run 50 simu-
lations with slightly different values of the media param-
eters. The last column in Table I presents the average
values together with the 2σ range of the variation be-
tween the simulation runs. The evolution of the support
for each of such runs is shown as thin line in the left
panel of Figure 5. Despite the relatively low variance of
the parameters, the range of the predicted results for Oc-
tober 25 (corresponding to the right edge of the figure)
remains substantial. Some simulations (in which PiS uses
a particularly effective communication strategy and PO
a very weak one) lead to a 55%/15% ratio of votes, giving
PiS full majority allowing constitutional changes. At the
other extreme, there are simulation in which both parties
receive about 30% of the votes. The thick lines in the left
panel of the Figure 5 correspond to the average over the
ensemble of the simulation results, indicating about 45%
votes for PiS, 27% for PO and about 5% (which is the
threshold for the parliamentary seats) for Mr Kukiz. The
right panel in Figure 5 presents a comparison between
the averages of the simulation ensemble and the lowess
smoothed poll results, showing a quantitative agreement
between the two, up until August 4th.
C. Conclusions
As we have noted in [1], the model on which we base
our current results contains significant simplifications
and omits quite a few important social phenomena. Ad-
ditionally, the choice of the range of parameters (such
as the overall importance of the media or the relative
fractions of various types of messages) is based on the
personal perception of the author. On the other hand,
the E/I/O model has already been used to successfully
describe quantitatively the behavior of a different social
system, namely participants in an Internet discussion fo-
rum [4]. The semi-quantitative agreement of the model
results with the observations so far is quite encouraging.
The comparison of the predictions with future observa-
8tions might allow us to narrow down the range of the
parameters. As we have noted, a careful analysis of the
Polish media could provide and independent check on the
plausibility of the model parameters, potentially leading
to a cross-check of the model validity or its deficiencies.
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